On 1 March 2026, the revised <span class="news-text_italic-underline">Arbitration Law of the People's Republic of China</span> came into effect (the “<span class="news-text_medium">2026 Amendements</span>”), representing the first comprehensive overhaul of the country's arbitral framework since 1995. The reforms reflect both the remarkable growth of international arbitration within the jurisdiction and China's ambition to establish itself as a modern, credible and internationally aligned arbitral seat.
China is already one of the world's fastest-growing arbitration jurisdictions. According to the 2025 International Arbitration Survey, Hong Kong and Beijing both ranked within the global top five seats, with Shenzhen and Shanghai also featuring in the top ten. The Hong Kong International Arbitration Centre (“<span class="news-text_medium">HKIAC</span>”) and the China International Economic and Trade Arbitration Commission (“<span class="news-text_medium">CIETAC</span>”) remain among the most widely preferred arbitral institutions worldwide, whilst the Shenzhen Court of International Arbitration (“<span class="news-text_medium">SCIA</span>”) continues to grow in prominence.
The 2026 Amendments are expected to reinforce this trajectory, particularly through new provisions on foreign-related arbitrations, recognition and enforcement and interim court support, areas which parties have historically regarded as obstacles to selecting a Chinese seat or institution.
The revisions represent a strategic upgrade across three core dimensions. First, they enhance credibility through modern governance by clarifying that arbitration institutions are public-interest, non-profit legal persons, mandating transparent internal governance structures and broadening the pool of arbitrators to include foreign nationals and technical experts. Second, they seek to align Chinese arbitration practice more closely with international norms. Most notably, this is effected through the codification of the seat of arbitration concept in line with the UNCITRAL Model Law, the introduction of limited ad hoc arbitration in designated pilot zones and provisions permitting two-way institutional openness, allowing Chinese institutions to operate abroad whilst enabling foreign institutions to function in designated areas. Third, the reforms serve China's broader national strategy by recognising online arbitration, reducing the time limit to set aside an award from six months to three, requiring timely court handling of preservation applications and providing a statutory basis for investment treaty arbitration.
The regime governing foreign-related arbitrations has been significantly expanded and clarified. Whilst the 2026 Amendments do not introduce a new statutory definition of “foreign-related” arbitrations, existing Chinese jurisprudence is expected to continue to apply, covering circumstances where one or both parties are foreign nationals or entities, where habitual residence is outside China, where the subject matter is located abroad, or where the legal facts giving rise to the dispute occurred outside the China.
Article 81 codifies party autonomy in relation to the seat of arbitration. Parties may agree the seat in writing; absent an agreement, it will be determined by the applicable rules or, where those rules are silent, by the arbitral tribunal. The applicable procedural law may likewise be agreed by the parties. Otherwise, it defaults to the law of the seat. Awards are now expressly deemed to be rendered at the seat of arbitration, providing critical clarity for cross-border enforcement.
Article 82 introduces limited ad hoc arbitration for certain foreign-related maritime disputes and for disputes involving entities operating in designated zones, such as free trade pilot zones and the Hainan Free Trade Port. This cautious, pilot-based approach reflects China's preference for managed reform, accumulating practical experience in a controlled environment before potentially broadening the scope in due course.
Articles 83 and 84 refine the grounds for setting aside foreign-related awards, aligning them more closely with international practice. These include the absence of a valid arbitration agreement, failure to give proper notice, improper constitution of the tribunal or procedural irregularity and awards exceeding the scope of the arbitration agreement. Where an award is set aside, Chinese courts will not enforce it.
In respect of interim measures, Articles 68 and 79 now expressly require Chinese courts to handle applications for evidence preservation "in a timely manner", directly addressing longstanding concerns about delays in obtaining urgent relief. Whilst no precise timeframe is specified, the legislative intent is clear. Efficiency is now a statutory expectation. For the first time, Articles 85 and 88 also clarify the pathways for enforcing Chinese awards abroad and foreign awards within China, with enforcement of foreign awards to proceed by reference to international treaties or the principle of reciprocity.
The 2026 Amendments broadens its scope from “arbitration commissions” to the wider term “arbitration institutions”, encompassing commissions, arbitration courts and other recognised bodies. Institutions must remain public-interest, non-profit legal persons, subject to oversight by judicial administrative authorities and the continued supervisory role of the China Arbitration Association. Article 12 expressly affirms state support for cooperation with international arbitration bodies, reflecting China's outward-looking posture.
The substantive requirements for a valid arbitration agreement remain largely unchanged. However, Article 27 represents a notable addition, providing that where one party asserts the existence of an arbitration agreement and the other fails to deny it before the first hearing, having been reminded by the tribunal, the agreement will be deemed to exist. By Article 31, Chinese courts retain authority to rule on questions of validity.
Article 22 provides that foreign nationals may now serve as arbitrators where they possess specialist knowledge in areas such as law, trade, maritime affairs, or science and technology. This is a significant modernisation, enhancing the diversity of arbitrators available for Chinese-seated proceedings. Through Article 45, arbitrators are also subject to an explicit new duty to disclose any circumstances that could give rise to reasonable doubts as to their independence or impartiality, with parties permitted to have reference to international guidance such as the IBA Guidelines when assessing conflicts. Article 43 now clarifies the process for appointing the presiding arbitrator, in that party-appointed arbitrators are permitted to jointly select the chair.
Article 39 confirms that parties may apply to the Chinese courts for asset preservation, specific performance and injunctive relief and that such applications may now be made before an arbitration has commenced. Similarly, Article 58 provides that, in urgent circumstances, applications for evidence preservation may be made prior to the commencement of proceedings. Both provisions align Chinese practice more closely with international norms.
Article 55 expands the tribunal's investigatory powers, enabling it to request relevant parties to assist in the collection of evidence. Whilst tribunals cannot compel production in the same manner as courts, this provision provides a clearer statutory basis for directing parties to cooperate and is likely to carry meaningful procedural weight in practice.
By Article 52, arbitration remains expressly confidential under the 2026 Amendments, with parties free to agree otherwise save in specified circumstances. The 2026 Amendments now identifies commercial secrets and personal privacy, in addition to state secrets, as recognised exceptions to the duty of confidentiality. Article 8 introduces an express requirement that arbitration proceedings must adhere to the principle of good faith, giving tribunals clearer authority to discourage abusive conduct and reinforcing the expectation that parties participate honestly and constructively.
Article 61 imposes a duty on tribunals to dismiss claims where a party has fabricated fundamental facts or where parties have colluded to use arbitration to harm state interests, public interests, or the lawful rights of third parties. Whilst the scope of "public interest" remains open-ended, Chinese courts have historically applied this concept narrowly, particularly in foreign-related cases and are expected to continue doing so.
The 2026 Amendments expressly recognise the legality of online arbitration, reflecting the widespread adoption of hybrid hearing models in the wake of the Covid-19 pandemic. In addition, for the first time, the 2026 Amendments provide a statutory basis for Chinese arbitration institutions and tribunals to administer and hear investment treaty disputes, where the applicable treaty and the parties’ agreement permit. This signals China's commitment to its international investment obligations.
The 2026 Amendments constitute the most significant reform of China's arbitral framework in three decades. At first blush, it serves to modernise Chinese arbitration law, enhance legal certainty and bring Chinese arbitration practice into closer alignment with international standards. At the same time, it reflects China’s dual ambition: to position itself as an attractive international arbitration hub whilst maintaining robust regulatory oversight and strengthening its domestic institutions.
For foreign parties and multinational businesses, the amendments materially strengthen the procedural foundations for arbitrating Chinese related disputes, with clearer mechanisms for enforcement, interim relief, foreign arbitrator participation and institutional cooperation. These developments should enhance the overall confidence of parties considering China as a seat of arbitration.
