<center><span class="news-text_medium">Court:</span> King's Bench Division (Commercial Court)</center>
<center><span class="news-text_medium">Judgment Date:</span> 17 June 2026</center>
Whether a party that has issued a timely challenge to an arbitral award under sections 67 and 68 of the <span class="news-text_italic-underline">Arbitration Act 1996</span> may later amend that challenge outside the statutory 28-day period and whether the Kalmneft factors should be applied differently where the original challenge was commenced in time.
The dispute arose from an arbitral award in which the majority of the tribunal held that it had jurisdiction and ordered the respondent State to pay compensation to the claimants in the arbitration, referred to as F.
The State challenged the award under sections 67 and 68 of the <span class="news-text_italic-underline">Arbitration Act 1996</span> within the 28-day period prescribed by section 70(3). However, it later sought to amend its challenge 162 days after the award had been issued.
The State argued that delay in applying to amend an existing challenge should not be treated in the same way as delay in bringing the challenge itself. In particular, it contended that the factors identified in <span class="news-text_italic-underline">Kalmneft JSC v Glencore International AG [2001] EWHC QB 461</span> should be applied with caution or restraint in the context of amendment applications. According to the State, the main line of authorities applying Kalmneft concerned late challenges, not applications to amend challenges that had already been commenced on time.
The State further argued that, once a procedurally compliant challenge had been issued within time, a “bridgehead” had been established. On that basis, the policy concerns underlying the strict time limits were said to be more nuanced. The State also submitted that the proposed amendments would not cause any delay to the substantive hearing.
Robin Knowles J rejected the application to amend.
The Court held that the Kalmneft factors do not require any special modification merely because the original challenge was brought within time. Those factors are a guide rather than an exhaustive checklist. Accordingly, the existence of a timely original claim and the fact that the amendments would not in practice delay the substantive hearing, could be considered as part of the overall assessment of all material circumstances. However, those circumstances did not justify permission to amend in this case.
Applying the Kalmneft framework, the Court considered the delay of 162 days to be very substantial. It was more than five times the statutory 28-day period under section 70(3) of the <span class="news-text_italic-underline">Arbitration Act 1996</span>. The Court held that the significance of that delay was not displaced by the factors relied on by the State. These included the time required to appoint new lawyers and the argument that F would not suffer irremediable prejudice as a result of the delay.
The Court also considered the broader statutory principles of the <span class="news-text_italic-underline">Arbitration Act 1996</span>. Allowing the amendments would not be consistent with the foundational principle in section 1 of the <span class="news-text_italic-underline">Arbitration Act 1996</span>, namely the fair resolution of disputes without unnecessary delay or expense. At the same time, the Court observed that the State was not left without arguments: matters already raised in its unamended statement of case remained available to it.
This decision confirms that parties seeking to amend arbitration challenges under sections 67 and 68 of the <span class="news-text_italic-underline">Arbitration Act 1996</span> must act promptly. The Kalmneft framework will be applied strictly even where:
The case is a clear warning that a timely challenge does not create an open-ended opportunity to introduce new grounds later. Parties should ensure that all intended grounds of challenge are identified and pleaded within the statutory period wherever possible.
<span class="news-text_medium">Case:</span> <span class="news-text_italic-underline">E v F [2026] EWHC 1493 (Comm)</span>, 17 June 2026, Robin Knowles J.
