<center><span class="news-text_medium">Case:</span> <span class="news-text_italic-underline">Taylor Wimpey UK Ltd v Taylor Woodrow Construction and another [2026] EWHC 2526 (TCC)</span></center>
<center><span class="news-text_medium">Court:</span> Technology and Construction Court</center>
<center><span class="news-text_medium">Judgment date:</span> 7 October 2026</center>
<center><span class="news-text_medium">Judge:</span> Pepperall J</center>
In <span class="news-text_italic-underline">Taylor Wimpey UK Ltd v Taylor Woodrow Construction and another [2026] EWHC 2526 (TCC)</span>, decided on 7 October 2026, Pepperall J considered whether earlier arbitration proceedings brought by a developer prevented the development’s current owner from pursuing a separate statutory claim.
Taylor Wimpey Developments (“<span class="news-text_medium">the Developer</span>”) engaged Taylor Woodrow Construction (“<span class="news-text_medium">the Contractor</span>”) to design and construct several residential blocks, completed between 2005 and 2008. Following the discovery of fire safety defects, the developer commenced arbitration against the contractor. In May 2022, the arbitrator ruled that the developer’s contractual claims and claims under the Defective Premises Act 1972 (“<span class="news-text_medium">DPA 1972</span>”) were statute-barred.
The Building Safety Act 2022 retrospectively extended the limitation period for DPA 1972 claims in June 2022. However, the developer could not benefit from that extension because its claim had already been finally determined. Its remaining tort claims subsequently failed because the contractor did not owe a concurrent duty of care.
In 2025, Taylor Wimpey UK, to which the developer had transferred the development in 2007, commenced court proceedings under section 1(1)(b) of the DPA 1972. The contractor sought to strike out the claim as an abuse of process, relying on authorities concerning res judicata and related principles.
It argued that the current owner was effectively seeking to re-litigate the developer’s claim and that the proceedings constituted a collateral attack on the arbitral awards.
Pepperall J rejected the contractor’s arguments and refused to strike out the claim.
<span class="news-text_medium">No privity of interest</span>
The court found no privity of interest between the developer and the current owner sufficient to characterise the proceedings as re-litigation of the same claim.
Although the companies were closely associated, the DPA 1972 imposed obligations on the contractor towards both its employer and subsequent owners. The developer and current owner therefore each possessed an independent statutory claim.
<span class="news-text_medium">Separate claims of the leaseholders</span>
The individual flat leaseholders also had claims under the DPA 1972. The court considered it just and convenient for the current owner to pursue claims on their behalf. Neither the current owner’s claim nor those of the leaseholders could reasonably have been pursued within the earlier arbitration.
<span class="news-text_medium">No previous determination on the merits</span>
The developer’s DPA 1972 claim had been dismissed because it was out of time, rather than following an assessment of its substantive merits. The judge observed that the contractor’s position was: “not that it should not be vexed twice by the merits of a claim under the DPA but that… it should never be vexed with the merits of a claim under the Act at all”.
<span class="news-text_medium">No collateral attack on the awards</span>
The current owner was not seeking to challenge the arbitrator’s decisions. Moreover, the arbitrator had made no findings on the merits of a DPA 1972 claim. The court therefore rejected the contention that the proceedings amounted to an impermissible collateral attack on the arbitration.
The decision distinguishes an associated company’s independent statutory claim from abusive re-litigation. A developer’s unsuccessful arbitration does not necessarily prevent a subsequent owner from pursuing its own DPA 1972 claim, particularly where there is no relevant privity of interest and the earlier claim was dismissed on limitation grounds without determination of its merits.
