The DIFC Court of First Instance has dismissed an application to set aside a partial award issued by a Dubai International Arbitration Centre (“<span class="news-text_medium">DIAC</span>”) tribunal, on the grounds that the application was filed out of time and, in any event, would have failed on the merits.
The underlying dispute concerned a claim for insurance coverage under a policy containing an arbitration clause. The tribunal issued a partial award dated 30 June 2025, dismissing the claim. The applicant filed a set aside application on 6 October 2025, challenging the award on grounds of jurisdiction, due process and public policy.
The central procedural question was whether the application had been brought within the statutory time limit. The award was received on 3 July 2025, with the three-month limitation period commencing on 4 July 2025 in accordance with Article 41(3) and Schedule 1 of <span class="news-text_italic-underline">The DIFC Arbitration Law</span>.
The applicant contended that the three-month period expired on Saturday 4 October 2025 and that the deadline therefore rolled forward to Monday 6 October 2025. HE Justice Shamlan Al Sawalehi rejected this reasoning. Where the limitation period commences, the three calendar month period elapses at the end of the day immediately preceding the corresponding calendar date three months later. In the present matter, the limitation period therefore expired on 3 October 2025.
The judge further noted that Schedule 1 already addresses the question of fractional-day prejudice by shifting the start date to the day following receipt of the award. Permitting an additional exclusion would go beyond what either Article 41(3) or Schedule 1 provides. The application was accordingly filed out of time and fell to be dismissed on that basis alone.
In the alternative, the Court considered whether the application would have succeeded on the merits and concluded that it would not. On jurisdiction, the judge found that the alleged errors of interpretation relied upon by the applicant did not amount to an excess of jurisdiction. The tribunal had addressed precisely the questions it had been authorised to determine and no more.
In respect of due process, the Court held that Article 41(2)(a)(ii) is directed at "fundamental practical unfairness, not a broad appellate review of how evidence was assessed." Significantly, the applicant's own counsel had accepted at the hearing that the relevant allegations of dishonesty had been fairly put to the witness in question.
On public policy, the judge reiterated that this ground is “narrowly confined,” requiring evidence of a fundamental affront to the most basic principles of justice. The applicant had adduced no expert evidence on UAE law and its arguments amounted to no more than disagreements with the tribunal's findings of fact.
This decision is consistent with the DIFC Courts' longstanding pro-enforcement approach to arbitral awards. It also serves as a timely reminder to practitioners that time-computation rules under the DIFC Arbitration Law must be applied with precision. Parties contemplating set aside applications should ensure that they are filed comfortably within the statutory deadline, without reliance on assumptions about weekend rollovers or analogous procedural indulgences.
<span class="news-text_medium">Case:</span> <span class="news-text_italic-underline">Okeke v Obike [2026] DIFC ARB 039</span> (5 March 2026, HE Justice Shamlan Al Sawalehi)
